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Abstract
In the early 2000s, several publications initiated a debate about the potential misuse of academic life
science research. The debate was refueled in 2012, when two studies describing the engineering of
human transmissive H5N1 bird flu virus were published. To facilitate the debate on dual-use research
of concern (DURC) and regulatory measures, we interviewed life science researchers working in
Switzerland about their views on DURC. The results indicate that all scientists interviewed were
aware of the debate, however, few had reflected about dual-use aspects with regard to their own
work. Although all respondents believed in freedom of research, a majority was supportive of some
form of regulation of DURC. This article discusses the major implications of the study, especially re-
garding the implementation of regulatory measures. In addition, preliminary recommendations are
given for raising awareness on DURC in the life sciences among researchers.
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1. Introduction
In 2012, the publication of two research articles on the creation of
airborne human transmissible bird flu viruses (Herfst et al. 2012;
Imai et al. 2012) has revived an intense debate on the misuse poten-
tial of life science research (Nature 2015). During a year-long, self-
imposed moratorium, various actors including the scientific commu-
nity, ethicists, security experts, government officials, the public, and
international organizations discussed whether gain-of-function
(GoF) research on highly pathogenic avian influenza should be con-
ducted and published (Casadevall and Shenk 2012). While the
moratorium has been lifted, the debate is ongoing. Its focus, mean-
while, expanded from concerns about the potential misuse of re-
search results by malevolent actors (biosecurity issues) to concerns
about the risks of an accidental release of engineered pathogens (bio-
safety issues) (Imperiale and Casadevall 2015).
As a result of these events, the US government has implemented a
funding pause on certain types of GoF research in order to assess po-
tential risks and benefits of such research (The White House Office
of Science and Technology Policy 2014). The ban covers GoF studies
that enhance the pathogenicity or transmissibility among mammals
by respiratory droplets of influenza, Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome (MERS) virus or severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) virus. While supported by some scientists (Lipsitch and
Galvani 2014), the ban has provoked an outcry by others who fear
scientific setbacks and potential negative consequences for public
health and pandemic preparedness (Reardon 2014) . While the pause
is still in effect and how to best address the threat is still a matter of
debate, new GoF studies are being published on a regular basis
(Sutton et al. 2014; Wei et al. 2014; Kong et al. 2016).
In 2013, the US Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) established a framework on dual-use research of concern
(DURC),1 which requires a case-by-case review of Highly Pathogenic
Asian Avian Influenza A virus (HPAI) Hemagglutinin 5
Neuraminidase 1 (H5N1) GoF proposals submitted to US funding
agencies. Other countries have so far left the regulation of the dual-
use problem entirely in the hands of the scientific community.
Scientific societies, funding organizations, journals and research insti-
tutions worldwide have released statements, established procedures,
and published code of conducts (or ethics) in order to address DURC
and GoF, including the European Academies Science Advisory
Council (EASAC) (Fears and Ter Meulen 2015).
Despite commendable initiatives such as the dual-use guidelines
for EU funding, the absence of a general framework at EU level cre-
ated practical problems: the Dutch government applied export con-
trol law for dual-use items (Council Regulation 428/2009) in 2012
in order to control the release of the H5N1 paper submitted for pub-
lication by the Dutch researcher Ron Fouchier (Enserink 2013). The
law was originally designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons, thus banning the shipping of
goods, pathogens, and technologies that could be used for nefarious
purposes. It was the first time it was used to control the publication
of a scientific paper. The use of export controls for this purpose has
been rejected by experts in nonproliferation and by scientific experts
alike as unfeasible (Enserink 2013; Palu 2014).
VC The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com 1




by WWZ Bibliothek (Oeffentliche Bibliothek der UniversitÃ¤t Basel) user
on 10 October 2017
In order to tackle the dual-use problem, researchers need to ar-
ticulate and debate their views about what risks are acceptable and
what research is truly needed. However, as European Society for
Virology (ESV) and American Society for Microbiology (ASM)
representatives recently pledged, there is also a need for increased
stakeholder involvement beyond the scientific community, especially
among ethicists, biosecurity experts, and public health representa-
tives (Palu 2014; Imperiale and Casadevall 2015). There is a wide
agreement that those scientists associated with controversial research
cannot and should not be left alone with the decision whether to
publish or conduct such research (Fears and Ter Meulen 2015;
Imperiale and Casadevall 2015; Frank et al. 2016).
This is especially important since previous studies with life science
researchers—conducted before the publication of the H5N1 studies—
have shown that most participating researchers were not even aware
of the current debates and concerns about dual-use research (Dando
and Rappert 2005; Kelle 2007; National Research Council 2009).
Moreover, a qualitative study predominantly conducted at UK institu-
tions revealed that most researchers did not regard bioterrorism or
bioweapons as a substantial threat and did not believe in the contribu-
tion of life science developments to the problem of biological weapons
and bioterrorism (Dando and Rappert 2005). A quantitative study led
by the US National Research Council (National Research Council
2009) showed that most researchers did not regard their own research
as dual-use even if it was categorized as ‘experiments of concern’ as
described in the so called ‘Fink report’2. When asked about govern-
ance options, a majority of life scientists did not support regulations
to control DURC (Dando and Rappert 2005; National Research
Council 2009). However, a study investigating the impact of dual-use
controls amongst UK life scientists working with agents listed in
Schedule 5 of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act
found that a majority of interviewees viewed regulation of DURC as
worth considering, particularly through increased screening of person-
nel working with dangerous pathogens (McLeish and Nightingale
2005). The same study suggests that, at least in the UK, part of the
scientific community was prepared to expend considerable effort on
improving risk management with regards to DURC.
In fact, in order to effectively implement regulatory measures, it is
essential that researchers are aware of DURC issues and supportive of
regulations. Thus, to get an insight into life scientists’ awareness, views,
and perspectives on DURC in the aftermath of the H5N1 cases, we
have interviewed international life scientists working within the fields
of microbiology and virology/cell biology. In contrast to previous stud-
ies, all interviewees of our study were aware of the DURC debate. This
article presents a summary of the main points raised and discussed dur-
ing the interviews, including the types of regulation supported by the
interviewees, the interviewees’ thoughts about the likelihood of misuse
and feasibility of replicating sensitive research results, as well as their
opinions about the publication and communication of sensitive re-
search. Subsequently, we discuss the interviewees’ personal judgment
about the extent to which individual scientists can be made accountable
for actual misuse of research. Finally, we connect our results to the
wider debate on DURC, discuss the major implications of our research
results, and provide some preliminary recommendations for raising
awareness on DURC in the life sciences through open debates, specific
educational programs, and weighted regulatory interventions.
2. Methods
We conducted and analyzed nineteen qualitative interviews with life sci-
entists working in Switzerland. All scientists interviewed were actively
working within the fields of microbiology or virology/cell biology.
Purposive sampling was adopted in order to obtain a diverse selection
of scientists from a selection of academic institutions (universities and
other research institutions with microbiology/virology research groups)
with diverse gender, age, nationality, and professional experience char-
acteristics (PhD students, postdoctoral researchers, group leaders, and
full professors). A total of twenty researchers were purposively selected
from the homepages of the research institutions according to their re-
search profile. Participants were contacted via e-mail outlining the
research. The email contained the following information: (1) title of
the study: ‘Attitudes, views and opinions of Swiss researchers in the life
sciences working with pathogens towards biosafety and biosecurity
issues’, (2) the foundation which financed the study, (3) the approxi-
mate length of the interviews, (4) anonymization of the interview con-
tent, as well as (5) the invitation to participate. During approximately
one-hour long face-to-face interviews conducted at their institutions or
at neutral meeting places, participants answered questions about biose-
curity and biosafety issues associated with dual-use research in the life
sciences. Besides the interviewers and the interviewee nobody else was
present during the interview. The interviews were recorded in the time
period between October 2012 and February 2013 using the Audacity
software.3 In addition to sets of questions about their knowledge and
attitudes about dual-use research, interviewees were given the details
of two case studies: the H5N1 engineered bird flu virus and the mouse
pox virus ( Jackson et al. 2001; Herfst et al. 2012; Imai et al. 2012),
and invited to share their opinions about such case studies. Additional
questions explored the issue of regulation, in particular, the problem of
whether and in what form dual-use research should be regulated. The
interview guideline was pilot-tested and was adapted during the first
interviews. The interviews were conducted by the first author (S. E-G.).
Interviews were transcribed verbatim in the original language spoken
during the interviews (English, German, and Swiss German dialects)
and were analyzed with the support of the analysis program Atlas.ti,
Version 7.0. Participants were given the opportunity to review their
interview transcripts. However, no participant made use of this option.
A repetition of one or more interviews was not necessary. To improve
comprehensibility, the language and grammar of the quotes used in the
article were slightly adapted while preserving the original message.
3. Results
Our analysis of the interviews with researchers in Switzerland identi-
fied four main recurrent themes related to the following questions:
(1) Whether and how dual-use research may be regulated, (2) What
is the probability and actual feasibility of misusing research results,
(3) How research results should be communicated (to peers and
public), (4) Whether researchers act responsibly or can be taught to
do so. Conceptually, question 1 is linked to the issues of biosecurity
and regulation; question 2 to the issues of misuse and replicability;
question 3 is to the issues of publication, communication, and public
opinion. Finally, question 4 regards the notion of responsibility and
the role of ethics. Each of these core themes was further analyzed in
detail. Although our interview study is limited in regards to sample
size and generalizability, we believe that it provides valuable insights
into the perspectives and views of the life science community.
3.1 Biosecurity
At the conceptual level, the notion of biosecurity was confused
with or conflated upon the notion of biosafety on more than one
occasion. However, when the notion of biosecurity was explained
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or became intelligible to the interviewee, the relevance and signifi-
cance of the debate over biosecurity and dual-use was immediately
recognized by most researchers
P1: ‘We have to discuss biosecurity; that is quite clear.’
While there was wide agreement about the necessity to discuss
biosecurity issues, almost all researchers did not consider biosecur-
ity4 aspects regarding their own work. The main reasons given by
the interviewees for not having considered biosecurity issues were
the low pathogenicity/virulence of the pathogen used in their re-
search, its host spectrum (non-human pathogen), and the kind of re-
search conducted (pathogen–host interactions, as well as
characterization of genetic factors instead of targeted genetic engin-
eering of the pathogen).
One interviewee pointed out that the discussion was centered on
the wrong issue. According to this person, biosafety issues are much
more important and need to be discussed primarily when manipulat-
ing or creating human pathogens. This interviewee claimed that the
threat of misuse is infinitely smaller compared to the potential of an
accidental release of such a pathogen.
3.2 Regulation
Regarding the issue of regulating research with possible dual-use po-
tential, some interviewees questioned whether regulation per se can
be considered a viable way of preventing risks. The practical impos-
sibility of implementing and enforcing fair and functional regula-
tions were given as main reason. For example, it was argued that it
would be difficult to identify risky research and that such attempts
could possibly result in an unfair blocking of someone’s research.
Another issue raised by interviewees was the lack of means for sanc-
tioning and thus stopping unwanted research.
P10: ‘Are universities prepared to sack a professor as a conse-
quence? What other options for sanctioning are there? I can cut
their funding, however, that equals sacking. Do I want to lose the
expert that may receive the Nobel Prize one day? . . . The idea [of
regulation] is good; I just have doubts about its implementation
. . ..’
Another common argument was that, in order to regulate effi-
ciently, it would be necessary to implement similar regulations
worldwide, which was considered difficult or even impossible.
P10: ‘Science is dynamic, I mean, if one implements a strong
regulation in one country prohibiting certain things, then one
cannot prevent such research in other countries, which did not
implement such regulation. I imagine it to be difficult to intro-
duce a world-wide ban on certain research.’
Nevertheless, few interviewees argued in favor of no-regulation
scenarios, for example, with risk-management being entirely in the
hands of the individual researcher. The majority of interviewees rec-
ognized the value of regulation (see Figure 1). Their opinions, how-
ever, diverged with regard to the regulatory framework to adopt
and the regulatory bodies entitled to enforce such regulation.
The following regulatory frameworks were proposed: (1) case-
by-case or (2) through general rules, implemented at different stages
of the project, for example, at the (1) funding- and/or (2) publica-
tion-stage.
P12: ‘I think that [regulation] also has to be put in place at the
beginning of a research project. Because a grant proposal could
turn into nothing, could be a complete failure, or could blow up
into something like this. And I think, yes, that’s why it is the re-
sponsibility of the funding bodies. And I think, the journals . . ., I
think it’s good that they are there.’
While some interviewees argued in favor of a case-by-case frame-
work with no general categorizations to allow for greater flexibility
in research, others were in favor of general frameworks with e.g.
general rules, codes of conduct, and definitions of sensitive research.
Responses diverged with regard to the regulatory bodies entitled
to enforce such regulations. Most researchers preferred self-
regulation through institutions of the scientific community. The fol-
lowing options were advanced and discussed (1) Independent advis-
ory body, (2) National funding agency, (3) Institute/University, (4)
Government, and (5) Journals.
One researcher, who argued for control on the level of publica-
tion, said
P11: ‘There has to be some kind of agreement between pub-
lishers, there has to be some kind of general rule which applies to
everybody. For example, . . . there has to be a clear definition of
what is classified, . . . and there has to be some independent body
that receives this kind of classified (information) from every jour-
nal. And they should decide (about who can access classified in-
formation). There has to be some independent body, independent
of the journals, there has to be one superior level.’
Most importantly, regulation was seen in possible conflict with
the principle of freedom of research. The activity of regulatory
bodies, as recurrently addressed, should not limit or temper scien-
tific freedom and scientific progress, but simply prevent significant
risks of misuse. Science, many interviewees argued, cannot be feas-
ibly stopped and should not be stopped, since the individual and col-
lective freedom of scientists is a crucial determinant of scientific
innovation and progress:
P11: ‘The scientific system should control sensitive information
better, but not at the cost of the benefits. It shouldn’t stop re-
search. What I mean is, I am somebody who supports genetic en-
gineering and such things, but with tighter regulation. You can-
not stop technology. You cannot stop science. I strongly believe
that you just cannot stop science. So all you can do is control and
be open about how you control things.’
An important theme in this context was the irrepressible charac-
ter of the scientific endeavor, both in a descriptive and normative
sense, making regulation substantially more difficult or even impos-
sible as many interviewees argued.
P7: ‘I think saying this should not be done or this should not be
published is very difficult. Because it’s something that is said be-
fore things are done, and you never know what will come out.’
In one occasion, the clash between the golden value of scientific
freedom and the need for regulation generated a moral dilemma:
P15: ‘I find it very difficult. The scientist in me says we should
publish everything because we want to reveal things and the goal
is to understand how exactly phenomena occur . . .. On the other
hand, this is not without danger. At the end of the day, having
some kind of committee entitled to decide yes or no, I would not
know how – in a fair and independent manner – how there
should be such a thing . . ..’
In this context, social responsibility linked to systematic regula-
tory models was identified as a possible solution to overcome the
problem of unfair and biased regulation. In several occurrences,
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submitting research designs or results with dual-use potential to
regulatory authorities on the initiative of the researcher him/herself
was seen as a form of returning social responsibility to the individual
scientist. For example, one interviewee argued
P2: ‘I would have no problem if the granting agency would ask
me after my proposal to explain the ethical issues of my own pro-
ject, because this is a way to return the responsibility to me.’
While a certain degree of regulation was generally favored, po-
tential pitfalls associated with excessive or ineffective regulations
were frequently addressed. Potential dangers associated with regula-
tory interventions were linked to the problem of increasing bureau-
cracy and seen as an administrative obstacle to the generation of
innovative scientific research:
P2: ‘It’s a bit scary, because you add one layer of control and that
means administration.’
An overview of the interviewees’ opinions on the regulation of
DURC is presented in Figure 1.
3.3 Misuse
The potential for misuse was seen as a ubiquitous aspect of current
bioscience research, based on the premise that virtually any piece of
knowledge or technology can be, in principle, co-opted for nefarious
purposes by malevolent agents.
P3: ‘There will always be a risk. There will always be people who
want to abuse something or who have malicious intentions and
want to misuse research results. This ambivalence is not under
our control that’s quite clear.’
Even more generally, the potential for misuse was not limited to
research results but seen as an unavoidable feature of many kinds of
information or objects, for example knifes, cars, and explosives.
However, interviewees’ opinions diverged with regard to the identi-
fication of potential malevolent actors as well as to the prediction
and assessment of risk. Three possible types of malevolent actors
were identified on a gradual scale going from (1) individual agents
to (2) organized groups, up to (3) governments and states.
Many interviewees evaluated the possibility of misuse through
individual actors or small groups as probabilistically low based on
the recurrent assumption that bioterrorist projects, with the poten-
tial to cause serious harm to the population, require large-size and
highly sophisticated infrastructures. These infrastructures, many
interviewees observed, due to their volume and high financial costs,
cannot be built and managed by individual actors or small groups,
but only by large and well-funded organized groups, terrorist net-
works, or governments. As one interviewee argued:
P1: ‘You need some kind of infrastructure, and I think that a
small group can’t go that far. I could imagine, theoretically, if
you think about the worst case scenario, that a state could do
this somewhere secretly.’
One interviewee pointed out that strict biosafety measures need
to be implemented to launch a bioterrorist attack against humans,
which, in turn, poses an infrastructural problem in terms of a sterile,
lab-like working environment and high-tech equipment.
P7: ‘At first they need the infrastructure. They need a lab. And
they are working with pathogens that can be transmitted to
humans apparently. So they can’t work in a lab like here (biosaf-
ety level 1-2), otherwise they could, they would get infected, and
they could also die. So the infrastructure is not something that
can be obtained easily, actually.’
In addition, many interviewees observed that there are much eas-
ier and more effective alternatives than bioterrorism; alternatives
with the potential to cause selective or indiscriminate harm to the
population. According to this stream of thought, potential
microbiology-based bioterrorist practices would hardly be worth the
effort in terms of financial cost, required equipment and expertise,
as well as magnitude and predictability of the outcome as compared
to other forms of terrorism. For example, an interviewee argued:
P10: ‘I mean, if you have a cell culture and the respective molecu-
lar biology know-how, you can do that (produce the human
transmissible bird flu virus), yes. But I mean there are so many
things you can do. You can even make explosive substances by
yourself, you just need to go on the internet and find all informa-
tion about how to do it.’
3.4 Replicability
Our results show that the practical feasibility of bioterrorist attacks
is not the only perceived factor at play in biosecurity risk assessment
and management. Issues of replicability are critically relevant, too.
Interviewees pointed out that, besides financial investments, equip-
ment and infrastructures, as well as socio-cognitive factors such as
expertise, knowledge transfer, and education are equally important.
Interviewees diverged with regard to what level of education is
required to effectively perform bioterrorist activities. While some
argued that a master’s degree might be sufficient to provide malevo-
lent actors with the necessary knowledge to pose biosecurity threats,
the dominant position was that a PhD degree, hence a certain level
of experience in laboratory research, would be required:
P3: ‘A well-educated PhD student could do it (replicate the pro-
duction of human transmissible H5N1 virus), one who works in
virology and knows how to do mutations, and possibly works
within a project involving viral mutations and recombinant
viruses.’
The element of training was repeatedly underscored by inter-
viewees, often in conjunction with the access to some tacit know-
ledge5 implicitly shared among microbiology/virology researchers
and inherent to their routine laboratory work. As one argued
P12: ‘If you’re not trained it’s impossible to do what we’re doing.
It’s not difficult to get the knowledge. I’m not saying that we are
geniuses. But you need training.’
3.5 Publication
The question of how sensitive research results should be communi-
cated was strongly linked to the issue of scientific publication. A re-
current attitude among interviewees was to underscore the
importance of scientific publications for science and the generation
of knowledge. This idea was repeatedly expressed both at the de-
scriptive and the normative level, in conjunction with the highly val-
ued principle of freedom of science. A safety-motivated or security-
motivated limitation of the publication of scientific results was dom-
inantly seen as an obliteration of the freedom of science principle.
One interviewee argued:
P4: ‘Research is all about difficult questions. I would personally
prefer to have free research and free publication.’
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The conflict between the normative principle of freedom of re-
search and the pragmatic problem of risk assessment was observed
to result in a moral dilemma tackling the essence of the entire scien-
tific enterprise. As one interviewee reported:
P4: ‘My first reaction was: this is dangerous. However, if you
look at the issue from a scientific standpoint, you need to live
with this knowledge. Otherwise we can no longer do science. If
you put restrictions on this, I don’t know where science goes.’
Results show that the same consequentialist and pragmatic ap-
proach was prevalent when facing the issue of censoring (key details
of) the methods section when publishing highly sensitive research re-
sults, as recommended back in 2012 by the US National Science
Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) (Fouchier et al. 2012) for
the human transmissible bird flu virus H5N1. Most interviewees
opposed this decision, underscoring its practical ineffectiveness:
P1: ‘Censoring the methods section is a really, really weak meas-
ure. If you can’t figure out the methods on your own, you must
be quite bad’.
P11: ‘You don’t really need the methods. The methods can be
found online. So if you know the mutations, you know the meth-
ods. You just need the ingredients, which are not impossible to
get, if you just spend some time and money.’
In a few occurrences, the importance of publishing research re-
sults unrestrictedly was not only advocated based on the normative
principle of freedom of science, but also on pragmatic and conse-
quentialist grounds. For example, few interviewees underscored
how ‘knowledge is the only thing that gives us protection.’ As one
interviewee argued
P1: ‘Knowledge is our best defense and the lack of knowledge is
the biggest danger; when it comes to biosecurity the greatest
problem is ignorance.’
According to this person, few scientists in the world are familiar
with the details of how to weaponize pathogens. Thus, it was argued
that research with certain agents should be pursued to preserve the
knowledge essential to distinguish sophisticated and effective from
improvised and non-effective biological weapons. According to the
interviewee such distinction between different forms of weaponiza-
tion could mitigate or prevent unjustified panic in cases of non-
effective attacks.
3.6 Communication and public opinion
With regard to the issue of communicating research results and
engaging with the public, interviewees highly underscored the im-
portance of science dissemination and the public understanding of
scientific research. Some researchers suggested that this could be ob-
tained by having scientists actively involved in public
communication
P6: ‘They should have scientists as a public communication part-
ner. Universities should do that (communicate scientific out-
comes), not scientists. It’s the duty of the university and they
should do far more there. Explain, reduce the complexity, be-
cause this is a real job, it’s a real task.’
The issue of public communication was frequently linked to the
issue of social responsibility in science as well to the relationship be-
tween science and society. Interviewees often implicitly assumed
that society is entitled a collective right-to-know, that is, the right to
be collectively and adequately informed about the latest scientific
updates. Based on this right, society should be entitled to play an ac-
tive role in the decision-making about biosecurity
P7: . . . ‘As scientists it is our responsibility to inform society. I do
believe that society has to know what we are doing. For me it’s not
a problem that a commission would say “this should be done” or
“this should not be done”. It is society, actually, that should de-
cide. But if scientists don’t know what is done in other labs, they
cannot tell the population or society what is going on in certain
labs. So for me that’s why it’s very important that there is commu-
nication and transparency. In the end society should know. For me
it’s the most important thing that scientists should do.’
However, many interviewees suggested that it will hardly be pos-
sible to eradicate sensationalism, which was suggested to have
fuelled societal fears with regards to the H5N1 publications.
According to those interviewees, scientists trying to advertise their
research were partly responsible for the exaggerated communication
of the H5N1 research results.
3.7 Responsibility
With regard to the issue of responsibility, our results reveal conflict-
ing attitudes. On the one hand, a dominant position among inter-
viewees was to not consider individual scientists responsible for
future misuse of their research results, in the light of the high num-
ber of uncontrollable variables affecting the reuse of information by
third parties:
P7: ‘The people that invented cars are not responsible for the
deaths of people dying in car accidents.’
On the other hand, however, the individual responsibility of sci-
entists was recognized and, in one occasion, even described as a self-
evident implication of research. As one interviewee argued
P2: ‘If one day something goes wrong, it would clearly be my
responsibility.’
The complexity of such conflicting attitudes was further revealed by
the interviewees’ opinions related to the issue of responsibility aware-
ness. A dominant view among interviewees was to maintain that a few
scientists do not have sufficient awareness of their social responsibility,
and that they are sometimes driven by selfish motives leading them to
make sensational claims with the purpose of maximizing their funding
opportunities and diverting public attention onto their research:
P6: ‘And some people, when writing a grant, of course they say
it’s the most important topic on earth, because it’s the most dan-
gerous bug on earth.’
In response to this phenomenon, many interviewees have favored
the development of strategies for raising or strengthening awareness
among researchers about their social responsibility, hence their duty
to engage in dialogue with the public and collaboratively address
biosecurity issues:
P2: ‘I think every scientist should ask these questions: Why am I
doing this; Am I doing only good for mankind by studying this,
or could it be bad in some respects?’
As one interviewee concisely argued
P4: ‘There is a need for responsible communication.’
In general, the interviewees showed a prevalent interest in ethics
and the recognition of the potential positive value of ethical training
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when facing biosecurity issues. Hence they favored the inclusion of
ethics in the educational curriculum of scientists. Some interviewees
argued that ethics training will not lead to a change in behavior since
the way people act depends mainly on personality.
No interviewee reported to have received training in dual-use
issues during their own curricular or extra-curricular education.
Finally, our results also show that training in ethics, in general, was
frequently missing among researchers
P7: ‘In my case it was definitely something that was missing. . . . I
think it is important for scientists to really know that what they
are doing can be used in one way or can be used in another way.’
An overview of the interviewees’ opinions on the importance of
including education on ethics and biosecurity issues into life science
curricula is presented in Figure 2.
4. Discussion
Our interview study, although limited in regards to sample size and
generalizability, provides valuable insights into the perspectives and
views of the life science community. In contrast to studies conducted
before the publication of the controversial H5N1 research (Dando
and Rappert 2005; Kelle 2007; National Research Council 2009),
our study results show that all scientists interviewed are well-aware
of the DURC debate. Interviewees indicated to have followed the
media coverage of the H5N1 controversy, in part due to their pro-
fessional involvement with infectious agents. However, despite their
awareness of the issue, the overwhelming majority of interviewees
revealed a tendency to neglect biosecurity aspects with regard to
their own work, showing how self-reflective attitudes might be less
common and harder to internalize than general theoretical consider-
ations. Thus, our results indicate that more effort is needed to facili-
tate reflection about dual-use issues regarding the scientists’ own
work.
When asked about their reasons for not having considered the
biosecurity implications of their own research, most interviewees ex-
plained that they were not involved in GoF research. This is formally
confirmed by the fact that none of their projects involved GoF or
could be identified as DURC, as classified by the NSABB (NSABB
2007). There are, however, a variety of life-science experiments and
technologies with dual-use implications, for example, the novel
gene-editing technology CRISPR/cas96 (Gurwitz 2014; Clapper
2016), which do not fall under the current definitions. This was
noted by one interviewee who recognized the dual-use potential of
his/her work during the interviews.7 One reason why researchers
might not reflect about biosecurity issues could lie in the narrow for-
mal definition of DURC provided by the NSABB.
In contrast to biosecurity issues, all interviewees had reflected about
biosafety issues, which may in part be explained by the tight biosafety
regulations in Switzerland (Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Fassung
vom 2015). When discussing biosafety and biosecurity issues, it became
apparent that there was a major conceptual confusion between these
two notions. We presume the reason for this confusion is twofold: first,
many interviewees were German native speakers and in the German
language the same noun (Biosicherheit) is used to refer both to biosaf-
ety and biosecurity. Therefore, the linguistic underpinning of some
interviewees might have influenced their conceptual categories. Second,
the conceptual confusion of some interviewees (including non-German
speakers) might reflect a degree of conceptual ambiguity inherent in the
biosafety–biosecurity debate, as already observed in media reports on
this topic and even in the expert debate (Nordmann 2010; Imperiale
and Casadevall 2015). However, this distinction became easily intelli-
gible to the interviewee after the interviewer’s prompts. This shows
that while some researchers may not be familiar with the relevant vo-
cabulary or may even experience conceptual confusion, they still share
a fair understanding of the problematics. These results are consistent
with previous studies that recognized a similar discrepancy between the
semantic and the conceptual level among other speech communities,
such as Japanese researchers.
The significance of the debate over dual-use in relation to both,
biosecurity and biosafety, was immediately recognized by almost all
interviewees. At the same time, all interviewees favored freedom of
research and understood it as a core value of the scientific enterprise:
research should and could not be stopped. Regulation was, however,
accepted as a strategy to minimize unintended risks and collateral
harms in DURC. Though hard to implement, regulatory strategies
aimed at minimizing risks were welcomed by many interviewees, al-
beit the probability of occurrence of those risks was considered re-
portedly low. Interviewees based their judgment on financial and
infrastructural limitations as well as on the easy accessibility of sim-
pler alternatives for terroristic attacks.
This seems to suggest that, by most interviewees, regulation per
se was not perceived in direct conflict to free research, providing a
more mitigated picture of the tension between freedom of research
and national security identified in previous literature (Kennedy
2008; Minehata and Shinomiya 2010; Suk et al. 2011). A minority
of interviewees, however, rejected any kind of regulation of dual-use
issues and suggested to leave the responsibility to conduct or not
conduct certain research in the hands of individual researchers or re-
search groups. For all others, the real tension was rather seen be-
tween freedom of research, on the one hand, and suboptimal forms
of regulation, on the other hand. From the perspective of inter-
viewees these forms included regulatory interventions involving dis-
proportionate administration, excessively pervasive, and strict
oversight, or the lack of scientific expertise. Even when the clash be-
tween scientific freedom and the need for regulation generated a
moral dilemma (P15), such dilemma seemed to be partly resolved by
the weighted and thoughtful use of regulation.
As responses diverged with regard to the regulatory bodies enti-
tled to enforce such regulations, we infer that the main issue at stake
in the context of DURC regulation is not whether DURC should be
regulated but how it should be regulated. The fact that most re-
searchers preferred self-regulation through institutions of the scien-
tific community might indicate a preference for more narrow and
small-scaled regulatory strategies. Large-scaled regulatory bodies
might be seen as vehicles of disproportionate administrative work
and tighter oversight, besides being out of the researchers’ control.
Not surprisingly, the fear of increased bureaucracy, administrative
obstacles and consequent delay in project development represent re-
current themes among interviewees.
The high prevalence of feasibility concerns shows how the prac-
tical dimension of regulation can hardly be decoupled from its theor-
etical dimension. One main concern of interviewees was to find the
right (scientific) expertise in order to be able to judge the biosafety
and biosecurity threats associated with the particular research.
Nevertheless, many interviewees argued in favor of establishing an
independent advisory board at the national level. Besides scientific
experts, our interviewees suggested to include ethicists, security ex-
perts as well as representatives from the public.
Doubts about the effectiveness of implemented interventions
seemed to be another major reason behind the general skepticism to-
wards regulatory measures at the level of scientific publishing. For
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example, the suggestion of allowing publications while censoring
the methods sections was largely seen as an ineffective strategy, since
methods can be easily inferred from other sources such as textbooks
(Engel-Glatter 2014). From the interviewees’ perspective, accordingly,
the decision of the NSABB (Fouchier et al. 2012) to publish the papers
about the human transmissible bird flu virus H5N1 but omit the
methods was seen as a fruitless or even counterproductive strategy.
Similar outcome-oriented evaluations were advocated when dis-
cussing the issue of risk assessment. It is important to note how the
degree of risk perception and risk identification may vary among dif-
ferent stakeholders. For example, one interviewee provided an inter-
esting example of how the societal and even professional perception
of danger regarding a bioterrorist attack with a sophisticated bio-
weapon may vary: by recalling the panic created by the 2001 an-
thrax attacks in the USA, when postal letters containing anthrax
spores were delivered to politicians and news media organizations.
The interviewee underscored the difficulty of weaponizing anthrax.
According to the interviewee, the production of infectious anthrax
spores requires high expertise in microbiology as well as specialized
large-sized and, thus, expensive equipment; hence it is hardly achiev-
able outside the military setting. This description is in opposition to
the assessment of other interviewees who underscored the alleged
ease and feasibility of producing and weaponizing anthrax spores.
Thus, the example illustrated how the societal or even professional
perception of danger may be disproportionate to the actual threat.
In order to prevent ‘misplaced’ societal fears associated with
DURC, many interviewees saw communication and public under-
standing of science as a critical factor. Some interviewees argued
that it is in the hands of society to discuss and decide what research
should and should not be done. Engaging with the public by creating
a dialog, thus reinforcing the trust in research institutions was
understood as an essential measure to bridge the gap between sci-
ence and society. This supposition is suggested, among others, by
P6’s emphasis on the fact that public communication is ‘the duty of
the university’ because ‘this is a real job, it’s a real task.’
In fact, some of the interviewees revealed to be actively involved
in public communication projects. However, could improved and
extended public communication indeed reduce societal fears of cer-
tain scientific advances? On the one hand, the positive link between
public engagement and trust has been questioned by those involved
in advocating, conducting, and evaluating public engagement prac-
tice (Petts 2008; Stilgoe et al. 2014). On the other hand, the lay press
often sensationalizes scientific results in order to gain the readers’
interest, and in some cases, might lack the adequate scientific expert-
ise.8 In addition, the ‘publish or perish’ culture in scientific research
motivates some researchers to conduct and communicate critical re-
search projects without careful reflection of the consequences. Many
interviewees referred to this problem by suggesting, correctly, that
Ron Fouchier, the corresponding author of one of the engineered
H5N1 flu virus publications, had sensationalized his research results
in order to gain attention for his research (Enserink 2011).9
The ‘publish and perish’ culture in science was also a major point
with regard to the question whether individual scientists are respon-
sible for the misuse of their research results. While many interviewees
did not consider individual scientists responsible for future misuse of
their research results, mostly due to the high number of uncontrollable
variables affecting the reuse of information by third parties, some re-
searchers recognized their responsibility and rated it as important.
Interviewees’ conflicting attitudes toward responsibility indicate
a tacit controversy among experts about the degree of responsibility
and accountability of individual researchers. The controversial
nature is further underscored by the fact that some interviewees,
who did not consider themselves responsible for the future use of re-
search results, also maintained that individual scientists usually do
not have sufficient awareness of their social responsibility, and
criticized that some scientists might be driven by selfish motives.
The topic of responsibility was a major trigger of the interviewees’
interest in ethics and ethics training, which appeared frequently
missing. While some interviewees argued that ethics training would
unlikely lead to a change in behavior, many favored the inclusion of
ethical training into the educational curriculum of scientists working
in DURC in order to increase awareness of the issue.
In summary, interviewees of our study addressed various key
issues regarding the problem of DURC. First, while underscoring the
importance of generating scientific knowledge, they also identified in-
herent risks in research, including misuse by third parties. In order to
minimize unintended risks and collateral harms in DURC, inter-
viewees suggested developing and improving biosafety approaches,
such as vaccinations against newly created viruses. They also sug-
gested implementing more rigorous evaluative criteria for demarcating
and prioritizing truly beneficial research, although they acknowledged
the difficulty of such demarcation. Generally, a majority of inter-
viewees saw the need to regulate DURC, preferably through self-
regulatory measures. Nevertheless, many were in favor of an inde-
pendent advisory board on a national level. Interviewees also argued
that researchers need to be aware of DURC issues and self-reflect
about their research projects. Lastly, interviewees saw a need to im-
prove the way research results are communicated to the public.
These results are consistent with the findings and normative sug-
gestions of previous studies on DURC. For example, Imperiale and
Casadevall have summarized the main issues of the current debate
on DURC and proposed a path forward (Imperiale and Casadevall
2015). Their suggestions include the acknowledgment of the inher-
ent risks in research, the development of new biosafety approaches,
and the creation of a national board to vet issues related to research
with dangerous pathogens. The need to create a national advisory
board has also been voiced by the German Ethics Council in a recent
report on DURC, as well as by the ESV (Palu 2014). In line with sug-
gestions made by our interviewees, the German Ethics Council add-
itionally recommended to increase awareness of DURC, for
example, through ethics teaching (German Ethics Council 2014).
The inclusion of biosecurity sections in publications and funding ap-
plications, as suggested by our interviewees, was recommended by
Gronvall as another possibility to increase awareness as well as self-
reflection (Gronvall 2013; German Ethics Council 2014).
Our results, thus, suggest that at least part of the life science
community has reflected about DURC and sees a need for action.
They also suggest that involving scientists in the debate is essential
for identifying options to tackle the dual-use problem. Further par-
ticipation of other groups, such as ethicists, security experts, and
representatives from the society in the debate will ensure that viable
options are chosen, and may increase the acceptance of regulatory
measures by the scientific community.
5. Limitations
This study has several limitations. While the use of a qualitative
method allowed exploring a multifaceted topic in depth, due to the
qualitative design, statistically representative conclusions cannot be
drawn. Furthermore, the study sample may not have represented the
full range of scientists’ views from the field of microbiology and vir-
ology on this topic, since it was limited in regards to sample size, as
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well as geographical and cultural variation. However, since the inter-
viewees came from various countries (see methods section) and
worked at international world-renowned institutions and in labora-
tories with outstanding international reputation, we believe that we
have gained valuable insights into the views and perspectives of lead-
ing life scientists. In addition, selection biases might have affected the
recruitment process. The study was announced under the title of ‘the
attitudes, views and opinions of Swiss researchers in the life sciences,
working with pathogens, towards biosafety and biosecurity issues’
and could have attracted scientists who have previously reflected
about the topic of DURC. In addition, it could have stimulated inter-
viewees to reflect on the topic before the actual interview. However,
we are convinced that even despite these limitations the obtained
findings already show a variety of well-differentiated attitudes which
add significant knowledge about how scientists perceive DURC.
Further research is required to compare the views, perspectives, and
attitudes on DURC of researchers not only in the context of GoF but
also among researchers working in other dual-use sensitive branches
of the life sciences such as biochemistry, mycology, phytopathology,
toxicology, neuroscience, synthetic biology, and genetic engineering
(e.g. CRISPR/cas9).10 In fact, having these fields of research with dis-
ruptive potential in the upcoming decades, their biosecurity implica-
tions need to be urgently investigated and assessed.
6. Recommendations
Our research results show that there is a need for raising awareness
and opening a public debate among researchers on the dual-use im-
plications of their research, even in the fields of virology and micro-
biology. In fact, although interviewees showed a basic familiarity
with the topics of biosecurity and dual-use, yet their views appeared
rarely self-reflective of their own work and far from being consoli-
dated into a robust and coherent ethical framework.
This absence of self-reflectiveness and thorough ethical analysis
is problematic for a twofold reason. First, it fails to provide re-
searchers with well-reasoned normative considerations and opera-
tive codes of conduct in their everyday research. Second, it fails to
provide researchers with a comprehensive analysis of the dual-use
problem not only in the context of their field of research, but also in
the context of research conducted in other fields of science, using
different (bio)technologies, or in the light of future research and
technological applications.
Findings from various areas of science have proven that dual-use
concerns do not solely pertain to research with pathogens but also
apply to other branches of the life sciences such as synthetic biology,
biochemistry, cell biology, mycology, phytopathology, toxicology,
neuroscience, etc. (Atlas and Dando 2006; McLeish and Nightingale
2007; Bennett et al. 2009; Suk et al. 2011; Tennison and Moreno
2012; Ienca and Haselager 2016). Raising awareness on these issues
in various contexts and providing researchers with a comprehensive
framework on the normative and practical implications of DURC
and biosecurity would facilitate the development of highly generaliz-
able and multidisciplinary perspectives on DURC. Such perspectives
are particularly important not only for recognizing cross-
disciplinary preventive strategies and safeguards, but also for antici-
pating future concerns associated to emerging technologies with
multiple applications (e.g. CRISPR/cas9).
In order to produce pervasive and long-lasting effects on the
scientific community and society at large, this process of raising
awareness on DURC and biosecurity should be included into the
educational program of students at the graduate and undergraduate
level as well as into the practical lab training of young researchers
(together with the teaching of biosafety). For example, biosecurity-
focused courses could be incorporated into the standard educational
curricula of students and young researchers in the life sciences as
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Via publicaon
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Figure 1. Options for the regulation of DURC.







Figure 2. Opinions on including ethics education with biosecurity aspects
into life science curricula.
The majority of interviewees (14 out of 19) were in favor of including ethics
education into life science curricula, especially courses that discuss biosecur-
ity issues. Two interviewees did not share their opinion on this matter.
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methodology, etc. This is consistent with the Article 23 of the
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, where it is
suggested that ‘States should endeavor to foster bioethics education
and training at all levels’ in order ‘to achieve a better understanding
of the ethical implications of scientific and technological develop-
ments, in particular for young people’ (UNESCO 2005).11
Bioethics and biosecurity education could be implemented in
various ways. A promising example is the University of Bradford’s
free available online ‘Educational Module Resource’ (EMR) to assist
university-level lecturers to incorporate ‘biosecurity and dual-use
issues into their life science courses at a higher education level’.
Researchers at the Landau Network-Centro Volta (LNCV) have
even advanced the idea of ‘compulsory biosecurity education’, not
only with the purpose of preventing and combating ‘present and fu-
ture threats’ but also for ‘helping relevant actors to fulfil their legal,
regulatory and professional obligations and ethical principles’
(Minehata et al. 2013). In practice, the implementation of such edu-
cational programs often meets well-rooted obstacles inherent in the
reform of academic curricula. These include the lack of space in
existing curricula, the lack of time and resources available to institu-
tions to develop new curricula, as well as limitations peculiar of bio-
security education such as the absence of expertise and available
literature on biosecurity education, and the ‘general doubt and skep-
ticism about the need for biosecurity education on the part of educa-
tors and scientists’ (Mancini and Revill 2008; Minehata and
Shinomiya, 2010). However, there are promising examples of uni-
versities having successfully included biosecurity modules into life
science education (Engel-Glatter et al. 2016; Maksymovych et al.
2015). The process of implementing biosecurity modules into life
science curricula may be facilitated through the inclusion of biose-
curity material into core life science textbooks such as ‘Molecular
Biology of the Cell’ (Alberts et al. 2015).
In addition, based on the views of interviewees, we believe that
awareness could and should be raised through the weighted use of
regulatory interventions aimed at maximizing biosecurity without
thereby harming the freedom of researcher. The hypothesis of self-
regulation by the scientific community and its institutions was highly
welcomed by the researchers involved in our study. It should be part
of the regulatory approach, not only as a pragmatic measure for
reducing administrative work, but also as an instrument to raise
social responsibility among researchers. For example, as suggested by
one interviewee, a biosecurity section could be incorporated into the
standard templates of research project submissions to funding agen-
cies in a similar manner as other research ethics requirement such
‘conflict of interest’, ‘authorship declaration’, ‘re-use of data’, etc. It
could include detailed explanations of why the work should be
undertaken despite the potential risks, as well as detailed information
on the safety precautions (Gronvall 2013). In particular, a protocol
for the disclosure of DURC similar to current protocols for the dis-
closure of conflict of interest might a cheap, easy-to-implement, and
effective solution. Such institutional regulatory interventions could
occur at the level of funding agencies, research centers, and pub-
lishers and have already been implemented in the UK by the
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC),
the Medical Research Council (MRC), and the Wellcome Trust.12
However, there is a need to elaborate which kind of knowledge and
expertise is essential to interpret and evaluate these sections.
However, relying on self-regulation only will most likely not re-
sult in the implementation of measures effectively addressing the
dual-use problem. Our interviews confirm that the dual-use topic
creates a conflict between scientific freedom and promotion of
security (Miller and Selgelid 2007; Selgelid 2009). The scientific
community has little interest in delaying or even stopping potentially
successful biomedical research in the light of biosecurity threats.
The success of any other regulatory model will depend on the ac-
tive participation and support of the scientific community. In 2014,
Smith and Kamradt-Scott (2014) suggested tying funding to over-
sight and using a multidisciplinary approach for reviewing dual-use
research. This model, despite concerns raised about its implementation,
was welcomed by many of our interviewees. There are many obstacles
impeding the successful implementation of such a regulatory model
(Ehrlich 2014; Lev and Samimian-Darash 2014). However, with the
combined effort of all stakeholders, including the scientific community,
the security community, and government officials, it may be a viable
option for regulating DURC (Jacobsen et al. 2014). Finally, we are
aware that our study results are not generalizable; nevertheless we
believe that our results might light a passable path forward.
7. Conclusion
Since the recent re-ignition of the debate on DURC, issues of biosaf-
ety and biosecurity have been widely discussed in the literature on
microbiology/virology. Yet, a high degree of uncertainty remains
with regard to the problems of risk-assessment, prevention, and on
the implementation of regulatory measures. To enrich the under-
standing of these problems, facilitate the debate on the topic of
dual-use, and elicit effective preventive measures and appropriate
regulatory interventions, we have investigated the views and atti-
tudes on DURC in the life sciences of international life scientists in
Switzerland. In contrast to previous studies, which reported a lim-
ited awareness towards DURC among researchers, our results indi-
cate that scientists are generally aware of the problem, but often
lack the self-reflective attitude necessary for identifying and assess-
ing dual-use aspects related to their own work. The interviews also
show that, although freedom of research is widely considered a non-
negotiable value, most researchers are supportive of some form of
regulation of dual-use research, including via external advisory boards.
Linking empirical data with existing normative literature, we provided
recommendations for raising awareness on DURC in the life sciences
among researchers and the public, for improving risk-assessment
among individual scientists, and for the selection of preventive strat-
egies. These include creating a solid and generalizable theoretical
framework on DURC, updating educational curricula in the life sci-
ences as to include or expand bioethics and biosecurity training, and
pondering a weighted use of regulatory interventions aimed at maxi-
mizing biosecurity without thereby harming the freedom of research.
In implementing such strategies, a cooperative effort should be pur-
sued in a manner that actively involves scientists, ethicists, security ex-
perts, and regulatory agencies on an equal footing.
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Notes
1. Potential risks and benefits associated with Highly Pathogenic
Asian Avian Influenza A virus (HPAI) Hemagglutinin 5
Neuraminidase 1 (H5N1) Gain-of-Function (GoF) proposals
with strains that are transmissible among mammals by
respiratory droplets are reviewed on a case-by-case basis by
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the funding agency and the US Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS). According to the framework, such
proposals are only acceptable if certain criteria are met. For




2. In 2004, the US National Academies published the highly
influential report ‘Biotechnology Research in an Age of
Terrorism’ in an attempt to address concerns over life sci-
ence research and to find a formal definition of dual-use
research (National Research Council 2004). The committee
was headed by Professor Gerald R. Fink, Professor of
Genetics, Whitehead Institute, MIT, Boston, MA.
3. Audacity software is a free audio editor and recorder,
more information available on the website 5http://auda
city.sourceforge.net/ about/4 accessed 29 Apr 2017.
4. Biosecurity can be defined as: ‘. . . the sum of risk man-
agement practices in defense against biological threats’,
which includes aversion of biological terrorism and other
disease breakouts’ (Meyerson and Reaser 2002).
5. The term tacit knowledge was first coined by Polanyi
who defined it as: ‘. . .things that we know but cannot
tell.’ Polanyi (1962). In the context of the dual-use prob-
lem the role of tacit knowledge has been discussed by
Engel-Glatter (2014).
6. CRISPR/cas9 stands for Clustered Regularly Interspaced
Short Palindromic Repeats/CRISPR-associated protein 9, a
genome editing technique which allows for targeted dele-
tion and insertion of genes.
7. The project discovered strains of a certain pathogen that
lacked the markers essential for detection with one of sev-
eral possible detection technologies. The pathogen is listed
on the select agents and toxins list 5http://www.select
agents.gov/SelectAgentsandToxinsList.html4 accessed 29
Apr 2017. During the interview, the interviewee explained
that the intention of the research was not to provide a
roadmap for terrorists, but to show the limitations of a
particular detection technology.
8. See the blog of virology Professor Vincent Racaniello
5http://www.virology.ws/2013/01/24/headline-writers-please-
take-a-virology-course4 accessed 29 Apr 2017.
9. The topic is explored by Professor Vincent Racaniello
5http://www.virology.ws/2012/03/01/influenza-h5n1-is-not-lethal-
in-ferrets-after-airborne-transmission4 accessed 29 Apr 2017.
10. The CRISPR/cas9 gene-editing technology provoked intense
debates about whether its application in some fields is
ethical. These include gene editing of human embryos
(Baltimore et al. 2015), gene editing of insects and their
unintended release into the environment (Akbari et al.
2015), as well as the possibility that the technology could
be applied by people with malevolent intentions to alter
and release dangerous pathogens.
11. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (2005) ‘Universal Declaration on Bioethics
and Human Rights’ 5http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID31058&URL_DODO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION201.
html4 accessed 29 Apr 2017.
12. The joint policy is available at5https://wellcome.ac.uk/
funding/managing-grant/managing-risks-research-misuse4 ac-
cessed 26 Apr 2017.
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